Incorporating the Third Party Beneficiary Principle in Natural Resource Contracts by Gathii, James T
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law
LAW eCommons
Faculty Publications & Other Works
2014
Incorporating the Third Party Beneficiary Principle
in Natural Resource Contracts
James T. Gathii
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law, jgathii@luc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications & Other Works
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gathii, James T., Incorporating the Third Party Beneficiary Principle in Natural Resource Contracts, 43 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 93
2014.
 
93 
INCORPORATING THE THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY PRINCIPLE 
IN NATURAL RESOURCE CONTRACTS 
James Thuo Gathii* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 94 
II. CURRENT EFFORTS AT ADDRESSING EXTRACTIVE RESOURCES .... 100 
III. THE THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY PRINCIPLE .................................. 102 
A. Introduction to Third Party Beneficiary Principle ................... 102 
B. The Evolution of Recognizing Third Party Beneficiary 
Rights ........................................................................................ 104 
C. The First Restatement of the Law of Contracts ........................ 107 
D. The Second Restatement of the Law of Contracts .................... 109 
E. Modern Application of Third Party Beneficiary Principle 
in the United States .................................................................. 110 
F. Evolution of the Third Party Beneficiary Principle Abroad .... 112 
IV. BASIS OF THIRD PARTY LEGAL INTERESTS IN RESOURCE 
CONTRACTS .................................................................................... 114 
A. Consistency Between Wishes of Contracting Parties and 
Third Party Beneficiaries ......................................................... 114 
B. Resource Development Should Benefit Local Citizens ............. 117 
C.  Interests of Justice and Morality ............................................... 125 
D.  Public Policy Rationales ........................................................... 129 
V. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
STANDING IN RESOURCE CONTRACTS ............................................ 133 
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 137 
  
                                                                                                                   
 *  Wing-Tat Lee Chair of International Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law and 
Member of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Working Group on 
Extractive Industries, Human Rights and the Environment.  I would like to thank Michael 
Weiss, Chad Nold, Nick Fedde, Chloe Bremer, Pierre Guigue and Griffen Thorne for their 
excellent research assistance. 
94 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 43:93 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Citizens of low-income, resource rich countries have absolutely no voice 
in the negotiation or signing of natural resource contracts between their 
governments and private investors, even though they are almost always 
deeply (and often detrimentally) affected by the terms of the contracts and 
resource extraction.  To make matters worse, government officials in low-
income, resource rich countries often lack both capacity and experience to 
negotiate complex contracts with multinational corporations, which can 
ultimately harm both the government and its citizens.1  There is no symmetry 
between the negotiating ability of low-income, resource rich countries and 
experienced and vastly wealthy multinational corporations.  It is notable that 
the issues involved go beyond bargaining power, resources and capacity; 
there is generally no transparency in either contract negotiations or in 
revenues that companies pay to access natural resources.  However, this 
Article addresses a different aspect of natural resource contracting: the Third 
Party Beneficiary Principle and how it can protect the rights of citizens in 
third world countries. 
When resource extraction harms local communities, those communities are 
often without legal remedy.2  Because these citizens did not sign the contract, 
                                                                                                                   
 1 One commentator suggests: 
There is an unavoidable conflict of interest between (usually foreign) natural-
resource companies and host countries: The former want to minimize what 
they pay, while the latter need to maximize it.  Well-designed, competitive, 
transparent auctions can generate much more revenue than sweetheart deals.  
Contracts, too, should be transparent, and should ensure that if prices soar—
as they have repeatedly—the windfall gain does not go only to the company. 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, From Resource Curse to Blessing, PROJ. SYNDICATE (Aug. 6, 2012), http:// 
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/from-resource-curse-to-blessing-by-joseph-e--stiglitz. 
But see Terutomo Ozawa, A Newer Type of Foreign Investment in Third World Resource 
Development, in BRUCE MCKERN, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE EXPLOITATION OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES 111–12 (10th ed. 1993) (claiming that “resource-rich but industrially 
undeveloped countries are learning quickly how to bargain for a greater share of benefits from 
the operation of foreign investors in extracting natural resources in their countries”). 
 2 For example, oil extraction in the Niger Delta has contaminated drinking water on 
which many local citizens depend, forcing those citizens to eat fish contaminated with oil 
and drink polluted water.  To make matters worse, the Nigerian government allegedly 
denied citizens access to information about how oil extraction would harm them.  Oil 
industry has brought poverty and pollution to Niger Delta, AMNESTY INT’L (June 30, 2009), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/oil-industry-has-brought-poverty-and-
pollution-to-niger-delta-20090630.  Often, governments do the most damage.  Human rights 
advocates have coined the term “natural resource curse,” meaning that income from natural 
resources in resource-rich countries is often misappropriated by corrupt leaders—for 
example, Saddam Hussein used income from Iraq’s natural oil to repress Iraqi citizens.  
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they lack privity, and as non-parties to the contract, they consequently lack 
contractual remedies.  For these reasons, classic contract law—in the absence 
of a promise to third parties and consideration from third parties—prohibits 
third parties from having standing to sue on that contract or to enforce the 
contract.3  Therefore, it is crucial that third party communities in low-income, 
resource rich countries are granted third party beneficiary rights, which would 
give them the necessary standing to sue on the contract.4 
Many recent examples demonstrate the necessity for third party beneficiary 
status.  One prominent example arose when the Cree Nation of Quebec 
objected to a uranium mining project on its territory.5  The investor, Strateco 
Resources, sued Quebec, seeking a final decision to permit the project to 
proceed.6  When the Cree Nation filed an intervention action seeking to be 
joined in the suit with full rights of participation, Strateco Resources objected 
on the basis that the Cree were not privy to the negotiations for the approval of 
the mining project and therefore could not intervene in the action.7  Cree 
Nation Grand Chief Dr. Matthew Coon Come replied, arguing:  
[T]he requirement of social acceptability as a condition for 
development in Eeyou Istchee is an essential aspect of the 
successful nation-to-nation relationship between the Crees and 
Quebec.  Strateco’s legal action represents a fundamental 
                                                                                                                   
Thomas I. Palley, Lifting the Natural Resource Curse, FOREIGN SERV. J. 55 (Dec. 2003), 
available at http://www.afsa.org/FSJ/1203/ index.html#/57/zoomed.  For a more in-depth 
discussion of harms toward citizens, see infra Part III. 
 3 I will follow up this breakdown of the will theory of contracts by mapping contracting and 
its implications in twenty-first century natural resource contracts in a jointly authored piece: 
James Gathii & Ibironke Odomosu-Ayanu, The Turn to Contractual Regimes and Contractual 
Responsibility in the Extractive Industry, 1 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. (forthcoming 2015). 
 4 In advocating for third party beneficiary rights, I do not suggest reducing any of the 
rights of investors.  To illustrate, I do not advocate that all natural resource contracts between 
investors and governments of low-income, resource rich countries contain Calvo clauses—
which require investors to submit to the remedies available in the country with which they 
contract, thus forfeiting international remedies.  JAMES THUO GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).  Rather, I argue that the Third Party 
Beneficiary Principle should exist to protect non-parties to contracts who could otherwise not 
protect themselves.  This Principle does not reduce any investor rights, but instead affords an 
extra layer of protection to third world citizens. 
 5 Henry Lazenby, Quebec First Nations Move to Intervene in Strateco Legal Proceedings, 
MINING WKLY. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.miningweekly.com/article/quebec-first-nations-mo 
ve-to-intervene-in-strateco-legal-proceedings-2013-02-06. 
 6 Id.  
 7 Jesse B. Staniforth, Strateco Tries to Sideline Cree Opposition, NATION (Feb. 8, 2013, 
8:41 PM), http://www.nationnews.ca/strateco-tries-to-sideline-cree-opposition/.   
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challenge to the principle of social acceptability, and to our 
treaty rights.  We are committed to protecting our environment 
and our treaty rights, for current and future generations.8   
Notably, unlike in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, 
Canadian contract law does not recognize the Third Party Beneficiary 
Principle.9  
Another prominent example is the case between residents of Kitui County 
in Kenya and Fenxi Mining of China.10  The Mui community raised various 
concerns about the impact of the mining project on them and their 
environment.11  The citizens claimed that the contract was unfair, in part 
because it was signed in a hurry and denied the locals the benefits proposed 
in local mining legislation.12  The locals’ representatives made a raft of 
recommendations, which were eventually left out of the Benefits Sharing 
Agreement that was presumably signed for their benefit.13  Suits against the 
government and several petitions in the case were filed, as recently as 
February 2014.14  To the extent that the representatives could not sue on the 
contract between the government of Kenya and Fenzi Mining of Kenya, this 
case demonstrates citizens’ need for third party beneficiary rights.15   
                                                                                                                   
 8 Crees Move to Intervene in Legal Proceedings Commenced by Strateco Resources, CREE 
NATION OF MISTISSINI (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.mistissini.ca/en/30-new-crees-move-to-in 
tervene-in-legal-proceedings-commenced-by-strateco-resources.html. 
 9 Patrick Macklem, an indigenous rights scholar in Canada, suggests that Canada has had 
the most success with third party indigenous claims because the treaty process has forced 
recognition of sovereignty for indigenous peoples in Canada.  PATRICK MACKLEM, 
INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (2001). 
 10 Forgotten in the Scramble for Lamu: A Position Paper on the LAPPSE Project in the 
Case of the Aweer and the Fisherfolk, KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (June 18, 2014, 
2:20 PM), http://www.khrc.or.ke/resources/publications/doc_details/69-forgotten-in-the-scram 
ble-for-lamua-position-paper-in-the-case-of-the-aweer-and-the-fisherfolk.html. 
 11 See Musembi Nzengu, Kenya: Mui Coal Mining Case to Be Heard on February 21, STAR 
(Feb. 5, 2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/201402050574.html. 
 12 Musembi Nzengu, Kenya: Mui Coal Deal ‘Unfair,’ STAR (July 14, 2014), http://allafri 
ca.com/stories/201407142310.html. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Nzengu, supra note 11. 
 15 Another example that exemplifies the importance of obtaining third party beneficiary status 
arose in Turkana this year.  For the first time in Turkana’s history, landowners have been offered 
to own part of the proposed Lokichar-Lamu oil pipeline in a move aimed at defusing tensions 
over compensation for the land taken up by the project.  George Omondi, Uhuru Offers Turkana 
Land Owners Oil Pipeline Shares in Wayleaves Deal, BUS. DAILY (June 23, 2014), http://www. 
businessdailyafrica.com/Uhuru-offers-Turkana-land-owners-oil-pipeline-shares-in-deal/-/53955 
2/2359210/-/o6qtrkz/-/index.html. 
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This Article proposes recognizing and applying the Third Party 
Beneficiary Principle in contracts between low-income, resource rich 
countries and natural resource investors.  A major impetus for this project is 
the increasing recognition of the need to build on the available set of 
remedial regimes for violations of human rights by business actors.  This 
project therefore supplements initiatives put in motion by the U.N. Guiding 
Principles on Human Rights to consider human rights risks and to find ways 
of addressing them in contract negotiations.16 
In both common and civil law countries, third parties have standing to sue 
on a contract under certain circumstances.  In the United States, the Second 
Restatement of Contracts recognizes third party beneficiary standing as a 
general principle and specifies certain categories of individuals as having 
standing to sue as third party beneficiaries.17  In many jurisdictions, there is a 
complex maze of approaches aimed at overcoming the privity doctrine.  
Stated most simply, the Third Party Beneficiary Principle is recognized 
where a contract is made for the benefit of a third party and allows such third 
party a right to enforce the contract by filing suit.18   
The Third Party Beneficiary Principle is not intended to circumvent the 
will of the parties to a contract, but rather to effectuate the parties’ intentions, 
especially where their contract was intended to benefit a third party.19  In 
addition, the Third Party Beneficiary Principle exists as a matter of justice 
and morality.  Thus, third parties such as subsequent tenants or purchasers 
are often allowed to sue an engineer or a contractor for the performance of 
defective works or the failure to exercise due care and skill in construction 
                                                                                                                   
 16 Special Rep. of the U.N. Secretary General, Principles for Responsible Contracts: 
Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract 
Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31/Add.3 (May 25, 2011) (by 
John Ruggie), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A.HRC.17.31. 
Add.3.pdf (Principle 9 contemplates that business should have grievance mechanisms in place 
for non-contractual parties affected by a project).  This Article argues that one can go beyond 
Principle 9, which contemplates only non-judicial (operational level) relief mechanisms. 
 17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). 
 18 See Drive Yourself Car Hire (London) Co. v. Strutt, [1953] 1 Q.B. 250, 272 (explaining 
that it was settled law for at least two hundred years prior to 1861 that a third party could 
enforce a contract that it was not a party to if it was made expressly for his benefit). 
 19 This may be more difficult to prove in the context of a government contract than it would 
be in the context of a commercial contract.  One scholar notes that the third party must show 
that the terms of the government contract must “directly provide for liability to the third 
party,” and that it is “not enough for a third party to show that the purpose of the government 
contract was to benefit the public.”  Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theory and the Failures 
of Public-Private Contracting, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2256 (2013) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 (1981)). 
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contracts.20  The remedies available in a suit by a third party beneficiary are 
contractual performance or damages for non-performance, specific 
performance or injunctive relief—the same remedies available upon breach 
to parties to a contract.  In other words, third party beneficiaries have a cause 
of action for breach. 
The recognition of third party beneficiary rights would supplement 
existing approaches to resolving problems in extractive industry operations, 
including contract and revenue transparency, codes of conduct, and the U.N. 
Norms on Business and Human Rights.  A major weakness of these 
approaches is that they are not legally enforceable, because voluntary and 
non-binding approaches do not give rise to enforceable legal claims.  This in 
turn reduces their transformative potential for those that suffer the 
unfortunate consequences of resource extraction and therefore would benefit 
most from having this principle.   
In my view, adding Third Party Beneficiary law to existing approaches to 
resolving extractive industries problems would be an important supplement to 
the available toolkit.  The Third Party Beneficiary Principle has the potential to 
tilt the incentives for investors and governments to pay more attention to 
vulnerable communities and peoples in resource extraction scenarios because 
contracts—unlike voluntary and non-binding codes—create enforceable 
obligations at the front-end.  In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, the absence of 
a binding legal regime for accountability in the violent extraction of mineral 
resources is facilitated by weak states lacking effective control over their 
territory and by the extremely lucrative trading of natural resources.21 
My argument is premised on rejecting the compartmentalization of public 
and private law in addressing resource extraction problems.  By that I mean 
that the current framework for addressing problems, or externalities as 
economists would call them, that arise from private law dealings—such as 
contract law—are thought to be primarily resolved through public rather than 
private law.  Thus, we see that many of the responses to the resource 
extraction problem are conceived in the public law arena, such as the 
“Ruggie Framework,”22 or in non-binding corporate codes of conduct.  
                                                                                                                   
 20 MICHAEL SAYERS, THE LAW COMMISSION, PRIVITY OF CONTRACT: CONTRACTS FOR THE 
BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTIES 16 (1996), available at http://lawcommission.Justice.gov.uk/docs/ 
lc242_privity_of_contract_for_the_benefit_of_third_parties.pdf (last visited July 25, 2014) 
[hereinafter LAW COMMISSION REPORT].  
 21 GATHII, supra note 4, at 237–42. 
 22 See generally U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [hereinafter Ruggie Framework].  
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These are all important ways of addressing the resource extraction 
problem.  However, private law approaches, like the Third Party Beneficiary 
Principle, would powerfully complement these current approaches.  The 
Third Party Beneficiary Principle would be one of the background rules 
against which contracts for negotiation of extractive resources would be 
conducted.  As a result, even if beneficiary communities were unable to 
pursue remedies in court, the recognition of the Third Party Beneficiary 
Principle would likely influence the negotiation of contracts by requiring the 
parties to take into account the rights and interests of local communities who 
reside in communities where resources are extracted.23  
The importance of adding the Third Party Beneficiary Principle is that the 
resource extraction problem arises from the contractual relations between low-
income, resource-rich countries and multinational corporations.  Given that 
these contracts lay down the foundation upon which natural resource 
extraction proceeds,24 it is important to examine contractual remedies to the 
resource extraction problem.  The need for contractual remedies is further 
underlined by how in some low-income, resource-rich countries.   Resources 
are exploited for the private benefit of a small class of powerful actors, 
including corrupt politicians and foreign investors.  In my view, the Third 
Party Beneficiary Principle is a critical step towards strengthening 
accountability within the extremely weak framework of economic actors in 
resource extraction.25  To the extent public international law has been unable to 
offer binding and enforceable rules to hold economic actors like corporations 
accountable for their conduct in the resource extraction context, it is important 
                                                                                                                   
 23 Epstein, supra note 19, at 2257–58.  Professor Epstein suggests that companies would 
bid more accurately and would perform better if these rules were adopted.  Though Professor 
Epstein argues that this result cannot be achieved unless there is a mandatory duty to act in the 
public interest, I believe that granting third party beneficiary rights to these citizens would 
achieve the same results. 
 24 There are of course examples of extraction of natural resources that are not conducted 
through contractual relationships in many war torn countries. 
 25 M. Sornarajah, Linking State Responsibility for Certain Harms Caused by Corporate 
Nationals Abroad to Civil  Recourse in the Legal Systems of Home States, in TORTURE AS 
TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATION 502 (Craig Scott ed. 2001).  Sornarajah further argues that: 
[A] developing state should be able to assert its rights of protection of its 
nationals when an alien causes damage in its state and its nationals are not 
provided relief in the home state of the alien in which his assets are situated 
and to which he has repatriated profits of his operations in the host state. 
Id. at 497. 
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to resort to private law remedies such as the Third Party Beneficiary 
Principle.26 
II.  CURRENT EFFORTS AT ADDRESSING EXTRACTIVE RESOURCES 
Currently, there are two major approaches aimed at addressing extraction 
resources.27  One approach involves voluntary or non-binding codes of 
conduct.  Another approach requires using a variety of home state and 
international regulations.  The first approach uses voluntary or non-binding 
codes of conduct.  One of the oldest examples was a draft Code of Conduct 
for Transnational Corporations under the U.N. Center on Transnational 
Corporations.28  There are numerous examples of such voluntary codes, 
including such multi-stake holder initiatives as the Kimberley Transparency 
Initiative,29 the 2002 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,30 the U.N. 
Global Compact,31 the 2003 U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations, and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights.32  There are also industry specific and company specific 
codes.33  The overwhelming majority of these codes were developed without 
                                                                                                                   
 26 I do not foreclose the possibility of re-orienting private international law in the direction 
of human rights as Upendra Baxi strongly argues we should.  See UPENDRA BAXI, MASS 
TORTS, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 276 
RECUEIL DES COURS 307 (1999).  
 27 Here I simplify a rather broad area by emphasizing the distinction between legally 
binding and non-legally binding approaches.  For a good overview of another typology, see 
Oliver De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in 
European Law (Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice, Working Paper No. 1, 2004). 
 28 See Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 23 I.L.M 626 
(1984). 
 29 See About: Kimberly Process, KIMBERLY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ 
en/about (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
 30 See History of EITI, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/eiti/ 
history (last visited July 31, 2014). 
 31 Overview of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobal 
compact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last updated Apr. 22, 2013) (the U.N. encourages its 
vendors to participate in the Global Compact). 
 32 Comm. on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, Aug. 13, 2003, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/sea 
rch/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2.  
 33 See, e.g., Business Code of Ethics, COCA-COLA (Jan. 2012), http://www.coca-colafemsa. 
com/femsa/web/arquivos/KOF%20Business%20Code%20of%20Ethics%202012.pdf; The Way 
We Work: Our Global Code of Business Conduct, RIO TINTO (Dec. 2009), http://www.riotinto. 
com/documents/The_way_we_work.pdf; Worldwide Code of Conduct, PEPSICO, http://www.pep 
sico.com/Download/CodeOfConduct/English_09.pdf (last updated Nov. 2008); Code of Business 
2014] THE THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY PRINCIPLE  101 
 
consultations with the local communities that suffer the adverse 
consequences of extractive industry activities.34 
Another approach has involved a variety of home state regulations—these 
are regulatory approaches taken by the States where companies that have 
engaged in extractive industries overseas are incorporated.  This approach has 
included using favorable laws to bring suit against extractive companies for 
violation of human rights, environmental and other laws in their home 
countries.35  For example, Canada enacted a code of conduct for its 
multinational corporations operating in the mining industry and opened an 
office to monitor and enforce the code.36  The U.S. has enacted a corporate 
disclosure law that requires companies to disclose any payments to a foreign 
government for oil, gas or mineral resource extraction in countries like the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in their annual reports.37  This law was 
successfully challenged in a federal court.38  Efforts to enact a similar 
disclosure forcing law in Australia failed.  In June 2011, the U.N. Human 
Rights Council adopted the “protect, respect and remedy” framework of the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights that require states to protect 
human rights, companies to respect human rights and to offer an opportunity to 
                                                                                                                   
Conduct, NESTLÉ (2008), http://www.nestle.com/asset-library/Documents/Library/Documents/C 
orporate_Governance/Code_of_Business_Conduct_EN.pdf; Code of Conduct, TOTAL, http:// 
www.total.com/sites/default/files/atoms/file/total-2011-code-of-conduct-en (last visited July 25, 
2014).  
 34 Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, Governments, Investors and Local Communities: Analysis 
of a Multi-Actor Investment Contract Framework, 15 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2014) (discussing 
multi-actor contracts as agreements among local communities hosting or impacted by a 
particular investment project and outlining a conceptual framework for an alternative means 
of ordering in the foreign investment regime). 
 35 See, e.g., TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION (Craig Scott ed., 2001) (containing essays on the 
topic). 
 36 Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for 
the Canadian International Extractive Sector, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TRADE AND DEV. CANADA 
(Mar. 2009), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciau 
x/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-strat-rse-2009.aspx?lang=eng; see also Building the Canadian 
Advantage—Ottawa’s Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, CAN. BUS. ETHICS RES. 
NETWORK (Jan. 4, 2013), http://cbernblog.ca/2013/01/building-the-canadian-advantage-ottawas-
approach-to-corporate-social-responsibility/ (describing that Canada released a report that 
“outlined a four-tier approach to ensure that Canadian companies would become the most 
competitive in international markets based on their ability ‘manage social and environmental 
risks’ ”). 
 37 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 38 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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bring grievances and have complaints remedied.39  These principles have 
received favorable reception in the business community.  This research project 
will therefore take into account these Guiding Principles. 
III.  THE THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY PRINCIPLE 
A.  Introduction to Third Party Beneficiary Principle 
Under classic contract law, a contract only creates rights for and is 
binding on the parties to the contract.40  Classic contract law tended either to 
deny the right of a third party beneficiary to enforce a contract, or, at best, to 
allow enforcement only by third parties who fell within specific, well-
defined, and standardized categories—most prominently, third parties to 
whom the promise owed a preexisting legal obligation.41  Courts under the 
influence of classic contract law applied the doctrines of consideration and 
privity to object to enforcement by third parties without attempting to 
provide a social underpinning for that result.42  In short, parties must be in 
privity with one another in order to bring suit on a contract.43  This is known 
as the privity of contract doctrine.44  Privity of contract requires that a party 
bringing suit based on a contract have something to do with the contract such 
as being the promisee or having some other legal interest in the contract.45  
The privity of contract doctrine is often invoked to preclude expanding the 
liability of the promisor of a contract.46   
However, die-hard adherents of classic contract law doctrine47 and many 
countries around the world are beginning to recognize that a contract can 
bestow rights on a third party.48  Further, as Professor Melvin Eisenberg 
                                                                                                                   
 39 See Ruggie Framework, supra note 22. 
 40 Second Meeting of the Contact Group for the Drafting of the Standard Material Transfer 
Agreement, Alnarp, Sweden, April 24–28, 2006, Third Party Beneficiary, Including in the 
Context of Arbitration, ¶ 10, CGRFA/IC/CG-SMTA-2/06/Inf.4 (Apr. 2006) [hereinafter U.N. 
Third Party Beneficiary]. 
 41 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1372–73 
(1992). 
 42 Id. at 1370. 
 43 See, e.g., Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280, 284 (1877) (“A mere stranger cannot 
intervene, and claim by action the benefit of a contract between other parties.”). 
 44 U.N. Third Party Beneficiary, supra note 40, ¶ 10. 
 45 Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 275 (1859) (Comstock, J., dissenting).    
 46 Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1365. 
 47 SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 354, at 683 (1920). 
 48 U.N. Third Party Beneficiary, supra note 40, ¶ 11; see LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 20, at 1; Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999, c. 31 (UK)  [hereinafter C(RTP) Act 
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argues, there are “strong social reasons” why at least some third party 
beneficiaries should be allowed to sue on a contract to which he or she is not 
privy.49  Contracts of this sort are referred to as “third party beneficiary” 
contracts.  Here, the beneficiary is classified as either a “creditor 
beneficiary”50 or a “donee beneficiary.”51  The third party beneficiary 
principle, allows a third person, “in his or her own right and name,”52 to 
“enforce a promise made for his or her benefit even though such person is a 
stranger both to the contract and to the consideration.”53  
There are two steps required to determine whether an enforceable third 
party contract exists.54  First, the prerequisites of a third party beneficiary 
contract must be analyzed, applied, and met; and second, the “varying classes 
of cases in which a third party has, or may have, an interest in the agreement 
between two or more parties must be analyzed and differentiated.”55 
In order to be a third party beneficiary, the claiming party must show that 
the contract was entered into by the parties primarily for his or her own 
benefit.56  If it is not clear that the contract was entered into for the benefit of 
                                                                                                                   
1999]; see also UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004, available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter2004.pdf.  
 49 Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1370. 
 50 Id. at 1374. 
 51 Id. at 1371.  A creditor beneficiary is created when a party owes a legal obligation to a 
third party prior to a contract being made.  See id.  The contract is mostly entered into between 
the contracting parties so that the party that owes the third party the legal duty will be 
discharged of that duty and the other contracting party promises to perform on behalf of the 
original promisee.  Id.  For example, prior to the contract A owes B a sum of money, A enters 
into a contract with C to pay off A’s debt to B.  B is the creditor beneficiary.  A donee 
beneficiary of a contract is a third-party to whom the promised beneficial performance comes 
without cost as a donation or a gift.  See 9 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 42.1, 
at 10 (John E. Murray & Joseph M. Perillo eds., rev. ed. 2007). 
 52 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 425. 
 53 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 37:1, at 9 (Richard A. 
Lord ed., 4th ed. 2000). 
 54 Id. § 37.1, at 16.  
 55 Id.  
 56 Goossen v. Estate of Standaert, 525 N.W.2d 314, 319 (Ct. App. 1994); see also JOHN 
COSGROVE MCBRIDE & THOMAS J. TOUHEY, 8-49 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: LAW, ADMIN. & 
PROC. § 49.140 (Walter A.I. Wilson ed.).  For example, in Peter Kiewit & Sons’ Co. v. Iowa S. 
Utilities Corp, a contract between an engineering firm and a public utility to construct a power 
plant made no mention by name of the ultimate general construction contractor, and contained 
no expression of any intent to benefit the general contractor.  The court held that the general 
contractor had no standing to sue the engineering firm or the utility for an alleged breach by 
the engineering firm. 355 F. Supp. 376 (S.D. Iowa 1973). 
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a third person, then he or she is merely an incidental beneficiary and cannot 
recover for a breach of contract.57   
Under the Third Party Beneficiary Principle, a contract between A and B 
for C’s benefit gives C standing to sue on such a contract.  A third party 
beneficiary contract arises when a promisor agrees with a promisee that a third 
party will receive the performance of the contract.58  Depending on the 
jurisdiction, the third party beneficiary principle either eliminates the need for 
privity or asserts that privity exists, by virtue of the party’s status as a third 
party beneficiary.59  Because there is uncertainty and unevenness about the 
enforcement of third party beneficiary rights, where the third party beneficiary 
is introduced, it is preferable that a choice of law provision be incorporated to 
reflect the general understanding of the availability of third party rights.60 
B.  The Evolution of Recognizing Third Party Beneficiary Rights 
The origins of third party beneficiary rights can be traced to English law 
in the 1677 case, Dutton v. Poole.61  Almost a century later, Lord Mansfield 
reaffirmed the Third Party Beneficiary Principle in Martyn v. Hind.62  This 
tendency to allow third parties to bring suit was followed up to the middle of 
                                                                                                                   
 57 See Century Nat’l Bank v. Makkar, 751 A.2d 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000). 
 58 WILLISTON, supra note 53, § 37.1, at 12. 
 59 Id. at 12–13. 
 60 See U.N. Third Party Beneficiary, supra note 40, ¶ 15.  For example, in a contract the 
negotiating parties could include a clause that references the UNIDROIT principles of 
International Commercial Contracts 2004.  Id.  Such clause could read “general principles of 
law as reflected in the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts shall be 
incorporated . . . .” Id.  
 61 Dutton v. Pool, (1678) 86 Eng. Rep. 215 (K.B.); see also Gary L. Monserud, Blending the 
Law of Sales with the Common Law of Third Party Beneficiaries, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 111, 114 
(2000).  Dutton arose from a family dispute in which a father intended to cut and sell wood in 
order to raise a dowry for his daughter.  Id.  The eldest son that was set to inherit the wood 
objected to his father’s intentions and he promised that he would pay his sister a set amount if his 
father agreed not to sell the wood.  Id.  When the eldest son’s sister was married and his father 
had died, he refused to pay his sister what he had originally promised his father.  Id.  The sister 
sued and sought to enforce the promise her brother’s promise that was made to her father.  Id.  
The court held that a suit that was based on a promise was not restricted to the person to which 
the promise was made, but the third party intended to benefit from the promise was allowed to 
sue in her own name.  Id.  But see Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1361.  The decision of the court 
was ambiguous because the Chief Justice decided that, the third party should be able to recover 
due to the close relationship between the father and child.  He suggested that a promise made to 
the father, could very well be construed as a promise to the daughter.  
 62 98 Eng. Rep. 1174 (K.B. 1776); see also Monserud, supra note 61, at 114.  When talking 
about Dutton v. Poole, Lord Mansfield stated, “it is [a] matter of surprise, how a doubt could 
have arisen in that case.”  98 Eng. Rep. at 1177.  
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the nineteenth century in Tweedle v. Atkinson,63 which reaffirmed the 
“privity of contract” doctrine and reversed Dutton’s recognition of third 
party beneficiary rights.64  In Tweedle, Judge Crompton said, “[it] would be a 
monstrous proposition to say that a person was a party for the purpose of 
suing upon [a contract] for his own advantage, and not a party to it for the 
purpose of being sued.”65  Thus, third party rights fell out of favor with the 
rise of classic contract theory.66 
The rise and sudden disappearance of third party rights in England was 
echoed in Massachusetts; however, the rise and decline occurred in a shorter 
time period.67  Massachusetts followed Dutton and its progeny until at least 
the early nineteenth century.68  Case reports in Massachusetts establish that 
third party rights were recognized for more than forty years.  However in 
Mellen v. Whipple,69 the development of third party rights—like in 
England—reversed course.70  Mellen reaffirmed Tweddle, reaffirming the 
“privity” doctrine.71  Post-Mellen cases did not completely abandon third 
party beneficiary rights; courts developed more complex exceptions to the 
“privity” doctrine.72  Finally, in 1979, the Supreme Judicial Court in Choate, 
Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc.,73 reversed Mellen, finding that the 
“privity” exceptions were becoming too cumbersome.74  
                                                                                                                   
 63 121 Eng. Rep. 762 (Q.B. 1861); 1 B. & S. 393. 
 64 Monserud, supra note 61, at 114. 
 65 121 Eng. Rep. at 764. 
 66 Monserud, supra note 61, at 115. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See id.  The first major case in Massachusetts was Felton v. Dickinson, 10 Mass. 287 
(1813).  In that case, Felton was a fourteen-year-old boy that was put into the service of 
Dickinson, who promised the boy’s father that he would support the boy until he turned 
twenty-one, whereby at that time he would either pay the boy $200 or give him a parcel of 
land in Vermont, whichever he elected.  Id.  When the boy turned twenty-one, Dickinson 
failed to pay him on his election as promised, the boy sued on the promise made to his father.  
Id.  He won a judgment at the trial court and the Supreme Judicial Court sustained the 
judgment on the basis of Dutton v. Poole.  Felton, 10 Mass. at 289.   
 69 67 Mass. 317 (1854). 
 70 See Monserud, supra note 61, at 115–16. 
 71 Mellen, 67 Mass. at 321.  The court noted specifically that, “[t]here must be a privity of 
contract between the plaintiff and defendant, in order to render the defendant liable to an 
action, by the plaintiff, on the contract.”  Id. 
 72 See Monserud, supra note 61, at 117. 
 73 378 Mass. 535 (1979). 
 74 See Monserud, supra note 61, at 117.  Notably, Monserud observes that during the 
Mellen era, other American jurisdictions recognized third party rights on contracts either 
through case law or by statute.  Id. 
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The recognition of third party rights was anchored in New York.75  New 
York’s 1859 decision, Lawrence v. Fox,76 gradually became the paradigmatic 
American case allowing third party recovery for creditor beneficiaries.77  
Lawrence v. Fox is celebrated today as a landmark case that established third 
party recovery on contracts.78  However, it was not remarkably enlightening 
for its time, because at the time, New York permitted third party 
beneficiaries to bring suit on a contract to which they were not privy.79  
Lawrence’s notoriety arose not out of its holdings, but instead out of the 
clarity of its several opinions.80 
New York cases continued to reaffirm third party rights.  For example, 
about half a century later, Seaver v. Ransom81 recreated Dutton’s donee 
beneficiary principle.82  New York courts recognized two classifications of 
third party beneficiaries.83  Notably, and as discussed later, this two-part 
classification was mirrored in the First and Second Restatements of the Law 
of Contracts.  Even though New York courts regularly recognized third party 
rights, the development of this area of law may not have been possible had it 
                                                                                                                   
 75 See id. 
 76 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).  In the case, Holly loaned Fox $300.  Id. at 269.  At the time of the 
loan, Holly informed Fox that he owed the same amount of the loan to Lawrence.  Id.  Fox 
promised Holly, but did not directly promise Lawrence, that he would repay Holly’s debt to 
Lawrence.  Id. at 271.  The majority of the Court (6–2 decision) agreed that Lawrence had a 
case against Fox.  The court noted that: 
In this case [Fox], upon ample consideration received from Holly, promised 
Holly to pay his debt to [Lawrence]; the consideration received and the 
promise to Holly made it as plainly his duty to pay [Lawrence] as if the 
money had been remitted to him for that purpose, and as well implied a 
promise to do so as if he had been made a trustee of property to be converted 
into cash with which to pay. 
Id. at 274. 
 77 See Monserud, supra note 61, at 117–18.  
 78 See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1363.  
 79 Monserud, supra note 61, at 118.  
 80 Samuel Williston and other casebook editors were impressed with the clarity of the 
opinions; consequently Lawrence v. Fox became a leading case for contracts casebooks.  
Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1363; Monserud, supra note 61, at 118. 
 81 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918).  Mrs. Beman objected to the will her husband, Judge Beman 
had drafted for her because her niece was not accommodated by the will as she had wanted.  
Id.  She was dying and instead of writing a new will Judge Beman promised that if Mrs. 
Bemen would sign her will, he would accommodate for her niece in his will.  Id.  When Judge 
Beman died, his will did not accommodate for Mrs. Beman’s niece as the judge had promised.  
Id. at 640.  The niece sued the executors of Judge Beman’s estate and the New York Court of 
Appeals upheld her right to recover.  Id. at 640–42.  
 82 See Monserud, supra note 61, at 118.  
 83 Id.  
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not been for Professors Samuel Williston and Arthur Corbin, and even more 
of the legal realists of later years.84 
C.  The First Restatement of the Law of Contracts  
The First Restatement of Contracts initiated the modern law of third party 
beneficiaries by pushing aside the doctrinal objections to enforcement by 
third parties and by moving from a rule-based body of third party beneficiary 
law to a body of law supported by a general principle rooted in social 
equity.85  The First Restatement recognized third party rights explicitly in 
Section 133.86  As recognized in this section, the traditional analysis 
categorizes third parties as donee beneficiaries, creditor beneficiaries, or 
incidental beneficiaries.87  The terminology of the First Restatement is based 
on terminology from Dutton v. Poole and Lawrence v. Fox.88  The 
establishment of a donee beneficiary resulting from the opinion of Dutton v. 
Poole was written into subsection (a) of Section 133.89  The creation of a 
creditor beneficiary resulting from Lawrence v. Fox was incorporated into 
Section 133(b).90  Finally, incidental beneficiaries—third parties that benefit 
from performance of the contract but do not have enforceable rights—are 
referred to in Section 133(c).  Sections 135 and 136 provided that a donee or 
                                                                                                                   
 84 Id.  Williston wrote an article for the Harvard Law Review in 1902 that examined how 
third party rights were assessed at the turn of the nineteenth century. Samuel Williston, 
Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Person, 15 HARV. L. REV. 767 (1902).  The privity of 
contracts doctrine was based on the will theory of contracts that was very prevalent before the 
twentieth century.  As Roscoe Pound noted, American courts began declining to take privity 
seriously in the early part of the twentieth century.  Roscoe Pound, The Rise of the Will in 
Law, 68 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1954).  For a full review of importance of legal realism and the 
breakdown of classic contract law based on the will theory, see Karl E. Klare, Contracts 
Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 876 (1979) (reviewing 
CHARLES L. KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL (1976)). 
 85 See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1374–76.  Suppose C is an intended beneficiary of a 
contract between A and B.  A breaches the contract with B to the extent that C suffers from A’s 
breach.  It is equitable to allow C to bring a suit in order to recover damages to the extent that 
he has suffered.  
 86 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932). 
 87 See CORBIN, supra note 51, § 44.3, at 52. 
 88 JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 17.1, at 642 (4th 
ed. 1998). 
 89 See supra note 61; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(a) (1932). 
 90 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  
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a creditor beneficiary had legally enforceable rights under a contract, but an 
incidental beneficiary did not.91 
The First Restatement focuses the classification of beneficiaries on the 
purpose of the promise that the promisor made to the promisee.92  As 
mentioned above, the three categories of beneficiaries are donee, creditor, 
and incidental.  The third party is a donee beneficiary if the purpose of the 
promisor was to confer a gift on the promisee; a creditor beneficiary if the 
purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise was to discharge a 
preexisting legal obligation owed to the beneficiary by the promisee; and an 
incidental beneficiary if he will benefit from the performance of the contract, 
but does not satisfy the criteria of the other two categories.93  Even though 
the First Restatement recognizes third party beneficiary rights, its focus on 
the purpose (of the contract) and the surrounding language is confusing and 
provides “no guidance [concerning] the critical question of how a court was 
to determine whether the relevant purpose was present.”94   
To avoid the ambiguity of the terminology in Section 133, many courts 
have expressed an “intent to benefit” test.95  This test requires that intent to 
benefit a third party be clear.96  The test varied between states; some states 
required that intent be clear, while others required it to be express or 
definite.97  Therefore, the application of the “intent to benefit” test was 
somewhat ambiguous, at least between jurisdictions. 
Professor Eisenberg also criticized the “intent to benefit” test because the 
term “intent” itself is ambiguous.98  “One of the fundamental disputes 
concerning the ‘intent to benefit’ test is whether both the promisor and 
promisee must intend to benefit the third party, or whether the promisee’s 
                                                                                                                   
 91 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, §§ 135–136 (1932) (implying that third party 
beneficiaries do not have enforceable rights). 
 92 CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 88, § 17.2, at 643. 
 93 Id.  
 94 Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1377. 
 95 CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 88, § 17.3, at 643. 
 96 Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1379.   
 97 Id.  Eisenberg cites several cases that applied the “intent to benefit rule.”  Those cases are 
Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pacura, 402 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (requiring 
that intent to benefit must be “clear”); Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 298 S.E.2d 25, 27 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1982) (requiring intent be clear); Khabbaz v. Swartz, 319 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Iowa 1982) 
(requiring that intent to benefit must be “express”); Snyder Plumbing & Heating Corp. v. 
Purcell, 9 A.D.2d 505, 507 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (requiring clear intent); Keel v. Titan 
Constr. Corp., 639 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Okla. 1981) (requiring express intent); Kelley Health 
Care, Inc. v. Prudential Health Ins. Co. of Am., 309 S.E.2d 305, 307 (Va. 1983) (requiring 
definite intent). 
 98 See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1378. 
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intention should govern.”99  As illustrated, even the test that courts use to 
avoid the ambiguities of the First Restatement is itself riddled with 
ambiguities.  Even though the First Restatement’s terminology and tests that 
recognize third party rights may be confusing and ambiguous, they 
nevertheless clarify the scope of third party beneficiary rights that have 
become unclear after the First Restatement.100  
D.  The Second Restatement of the Law of Contracts 
The Second Restatement greatly expanded third party rights, recognizing 
third party beneficiary rights from Sections 302 to 315.101  However, the 
heart of its third party beneficiary recognition is Section 302.102  The Second 
Restatement provides that a person is a beneficiary of a contract where a 
“recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to 
effectuate the intentions of the parties.”103  However, this requirement is 
qualified, because there does not need to be such recognition where it is 
“otherwise agreed between the promisor and promisee.”104  Thus, the Second 
Restatement makes clear that the general common law view is that parties to 
a contract may set whatever terms they deem desirable for the effectuation of 
their agreement, which the courts must recognize and uphold.105  
In some instances, courts establish a distinction between incidental/indirect 
beneficiaries and direct beneficiaries.  Only direct beneficiaries may be 
                                                                                                                   
 99 CORBIN, supra note 51, § 44.1, at 46. 
 100 See Monserud, supra note 61, at 122 (suggesting that Section 133 and related sections 
helped remove the stigma of recognizing third party rights and may have helped to “firmly 
root” third party rights in American contract law).  Under the First Restatement, it had become 
apparent that a number of third party beneficiaries did not fall within the “donee” and 
“creditor” categories, such that some courts simply disregarded the categorization approach 
and allowed beneficiaries who were neither creditors nor donees to recover.  The inflexibility 
of the categorization approach led to changes in the Second Restatement of Contracts, under 
which intended beneficiaries, who can enforce contracts, are contrasted with incidental 
beneficiaries, who cannot.  Section 133 of the First Restatement opened the eyes of several 
jurisdictions to the rights of third parties.  Many took issue with how narrow Section 133 was 
and wished to expand it.   Section 133 of the First Restatement was therefore the first step in 
recognizing third parties as beneficiaries. 
 101 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302-15 (1981). 
 102 CORBIN, supra note 51, § 44.4, at 55.  
 103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981). 
 104 Id. 
 105 See Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
694 P.2d 198, 206 (Ariz. 1984) (“A basic policy of contract law . . . is to preserve freedom of 
contract and thus promote the free flow of commerce.”).    
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recognized as a third party beneficiary.106  However, the determination must 
take into account the relevant law and facts.107 
E.  Modern Application of Third Party Beneficiary Principle in the United 
States 
Due to the evolution of the common law and the Restatements’ 
recognition of third party rights, third party rights have been recognized in a 
wide variety of legal contexts.108  In the context of government contracts, the 
Third Party Beneficiary Principle seems to have been first applied in 
Maneely v. United States.109  In Maneely, a decision barring a third party’s 
claim where there was no privity was reversed because the third party 
benefitted from the transaction.110 
In terms of government contracts, when a governmental entity contracts 
with a party, the citizens of the governmental entity’s jurisdiction are deemed 
to be third party beneficiaries to that contract.111  Courts have held that the 
essential element for third party beneficiary status is the intention of the 
                                                                                                                   
 106 Schuerman v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 420, 433 (1994) (“The court carefully must 
distinguish between incidental and indirect beneficiaries and direct beneficiaries, only the 
latter of which qualifies for third-party beneficiary status.”).  In the context of government 
contracts, see GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer St. Office Ltd. P’ship v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
Nat. Ass’n, 671 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, 
Inc., 588 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Parties that benefit from a government contract 
are generally assumed to be incidental beneficiaries,” rather than intended beneficiaries, and 
so “may not enforce the contract absent a clear intent to the contrary”)).  
 107 Glass v. United States, 258 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001), amended on reh’g, 273 
F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that whether plaintiff is a third party beneficiary “is a 
mixed question of law and fact”).  
 108 See Joyner v. Vitale, 926 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Alaska 1996) (explaining that, in the context of 
a mortgage, when a purchaser assumes a mortgage third party beneficiary law is invoked); 
Acoustics v. Hanover Ins. Co., 287 A.2d 482, 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971) (holding that 
a subcontractor is a third party beneficiary of a performance bond between the owner, contractor, 
and surety); Wilson v. Oliver Costich Co., 247 N.Y.S 131, 134 (App. Div. 1931) (holding that a 
non-inhabitant of the political unit in controversy may qualify as a third party beneficiary). 
 109 68 Ct. Cl. 623 (1929); see also GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: LAW, ADMIN. & PROC. § 49.10 
(2015).  In Maneely, the Government entered into a cost-type contract, one provision was, if 
the contract was terminated, the contracting officer would assume and become liable for all 
unliquidated claims incurred by the contractor.  After the plaintiffs supplied the material, the 
contract was terminated.  The plaintiff filed a claim, but it was disallowed because there was 
not privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the Government.  The disallowance was 
reversed on the third party beneficiary theory. 
 110 Maneely, 68 Ct. Cl. at 629.  Interestingly, Maneely applied a test similar to the “intent to 
benefit” test, citing Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280, 283–84 (1877). 
 111 See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1406 (“The courts have tended to give suits by third-
party beneficiaries under government contracts special or ‘categorical’ treatment.”). 
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parties for the contract to benefit the third party.112  Even the Second 
Restatement recognizes liability for a party that contracts with a 
governmental entity, but only if the contract expressly creates a cause of 
action for the third party citizens or where such a suit would be consistent 
with the terms of the contract and the policy of law authorizing the 
contract.113  Some states, such as New York, do not even require that the 
contract expressly create a cause of action for the citizens, allowing a cause 
of action to stand where the contract is intended to benefit the individual 
citizens of that governmental entity.114 
The Third Party Beneficiary Principle has been applied in various other 
types of cases, such as construction contract cases involving bonds and 
suretyships.  One such situation is when an owner of property contracts with 
the general contractor and requires the general contractor to put up a 
payment bond to ensure payment to any subcontractors. These 
subcontractors may be third party beneficiaries to the contract between the 
owner and the general contractor.115 
While these construction cases do not uniformly allow the subcontractor 
to enforce the promise within the contract between the owner and the general 
contractor, this disparity in the case law can be attributed to the special 
circumstances of the construction relationship because the subcontractor 
                                                                                                                   
 112 Montana v. United States, 124 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (implying a party is a 
third-party beneficiary of a contract with the Government if that contract “reflect[s] the 
express or implied intention of the parties to benefit the third-party” (quoting Schuerman v. 
United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 420, 433 (1994))).  
 113 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313(2) (1981). 
 114 See Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., 76 N.E. 211, 214 (N.Y. 1906) (holding that the 
municipality contracted with the corporation “to protect [the municipality’s] inhabitants,” so those 
inhabitants were third party beneficiaries of the contract); Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 238 
(“The right of the third party is . . . upheld in . . . the public contract cases where the municipality 
seeks to protect its inhabitants by covenants for their benefit . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
 115 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1397 (“[T]he modern tendency is to allow 
subcontractors to recover against the sureties of payment bonds in . . . private . . . cases.”); 
Daniel-Morris Co. v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 126 N.E.2d 750, 752 (N.Y. 1955) (finding that 
the primary purpose of the payment-performance bond taken out by the general contractor was 
to ensure payment to material men because the underlying contract required the subcontractor 
to furnish its work “free of the lien of any third party . . .”); Jacobs Assocs. v. Argonaut Ins. 
Co., 580 P.2d 529, 532 (Or. 1978) (finding that a subcontractor could collect payment from a 
surety when the general contractor defaulted in payment due to insolvency because “the bond 
was for the benefit of unpaid creditors . . .”).  But see Fosmire v. Nat’l Surety Co., 127 N.E. 
472, 473 (N.Y. 1920) (finding that a laborer could not recover unpaid wages from the surety 
under a payment-performance bond required by the Highway Law for a public works contract 
because “[t]he dominant purpose of this bond was protection to the state”). 
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generally has the right to place a lien on the owner’s property if the general 
contractor fails to pay the subcontractor for the work performed.116   
F.  Evolution of the Third Party Beneficiary Principle Abroad 
Like the United States, the United Kingdom and France have begun to 
recognize third party beneficiary rights,117 even though their paths to 
recognition may have taken indirect routes.118  In the United Kingdom, the 
Law Commission recommended the recognition of a third party beneficiary 
law in its report of 1996.119  Law Commission Report 242 led to a bill that 
was enacted as the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.120  The 
Contracts Act of 1999 allows a third party to enforce contracts that expressly 
provide for enforcement by a third party, and also permits the enforcement of 
contracts whose terms purport to confer a benefit upon a third party.121  
Unless parties explicitly agree otherwise, the Act does not apply to contracts 
entered into before May 11, 2000.122  According to the Commission, the 
Third Party Beneficiary Principle123 causes “difficulties in commercial 
life.”124  For example, in insurance contracts, there are some areas where the 
legislature did not intervene “to give third party beneficiaries a right to 
enforce the contract against the insurer.”125  The Commission mentioned the 
                                                                                                                   
 116 See N.Y. LIEN LAW § 3 (McKinney 2013).   
 117 See, e.g., James M. Hosking, The Third Party Non-Signatory’s Ability to Compel 
International Commercial Arbitration: Doing Justice Without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 469, 527 (2004) (“The trend in all three jurisdictions is towards greater 
recognition of third party beneficiary rights and application of a test which has at its 
touchstone the ‘intention’ of the parties.”). 
 118 See, e.g., HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 20:4 (2013) (noting that 
“[t]he major inroads on the privity doctrine have come from collateral attacks such as actions 
premised on unjust enrichment, tort, or the law of trusts”). 
 119 See LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 50.  The Act came into force on 
November 11, 1999. 
 120 C(RTP) Act 1999, supra note 48. 
 121 Rizyan Khawar, Reinsurance and Privity in the Past, Present, and Future: Privity of 
Contract in Reinsurance and the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act of 1999, 77 TUL. L. 
REV. 495, 499 (2002).  The intention of the parties is crucial to determine if the third party has 
privity of contract.  To be considered a third party beneficiary, the third party must be 
identified in the contract.  The C(RTP) Act of 1999 is very liberal in its determination of what 
constitutes identification.  A party can be identified by name, as a member of a class, or by 
answering a particular description.  Id.  
 122 C(RTP) Act 1999, supra note 48, § 10. 
 123 See LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 1 (“[A] contract does not confer rights 
on someone who is not a party to the contract.”).  
 124 Id. at 43. 
 125 Id. at 48. 
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situation where an employer can take out medical expenses insurance for its 
employees without there being doubts as to whether the employees can 
enforce the policy against the insurance company.126  
In France, third-party beneficiary rights are not the rule but an exception 
to the principle stated in Article 1165 of the French Civil Code.  Article 1165 
provides that: “Agreements produce effect only between the contracting 
parties; they do not harm a third party, and they benefit him only in the case 
provided for in Article 1121.”127  This principle that agreements “produce 
effect only between the contracting parties”128 is called in French law “effet 
relatif du contrat,” literally, the relative effect of a contract.  It offers a strict 
reading of the privity of contract doctrine.  Article 1121 of the French Civil 
Code states that:  
One may likewise stipulate for the benefit of a third party 
[“stipuler au profit d’un tiers”], where it is the condition of a 
stipulation which one makes for oneself or of a gift which one 
makes to another.  He who made that stipulation may no longer 
revoke it, where the third party declares that he wishes to take 
advantage of it.129 
This exception is fairly narrow and limited to those two situations: “the 
condition of a stipulation which one makes for oneself or of a gift which one 
makes to another.”130  Nonetheless, French courts have adopted a flexible 
approach that seems to be closer to the modern reality of contracts.131  The 
highest French civil court (the Cour de Cassation) used the concept of group 
of contracts to allow for remedies for parties who were not parties the initial 
contract.132  This concept joins contracts that are “mutually linked 
                                                                                                                   
 126 Id. at 48–49. 
 127 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1165 (Fr.), English translation, available at http://www.legifr 
ance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations. 
 128 Id. 
 129 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1121 (Fr.), English translation, available at http://www.legifran 
ce.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations. 
 130 Id. 
 131 See, e.g., Mitchel de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the 
French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1386–87 (1995) (“It is true that Article 1165 was 
better adapted to an individualist civilization than to the social and economic relations of our 
time, and that it becomes more and more difficult to consider contracts in an isolated fashion.”). 
 132 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] lère civ., June 21 1988, 
Bull. Civ. I, No. 85-12.609 (Fr.) 5, note C. Larroumet, comments of P. Jourdain, Rev. trim. dr. 
civil 1988, 762 and Ph. Remy, eod.loc. 1989, 107. 
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contracts.”133  However, the mechanism of Article 1121 of “stipulation pour 
autrui” (third party beneficiary contract) still necessarily implies some sort 
of relationship between the stipulator and the beneficiary. 
IV.  BASIS OF THIRD PARTY LEGAL INTERESTS IN RESOURCE CONTRACTS 
In this Part of the Article, I advance four reasons why the Third Party 
Beneficiary Rule applies to resource extraction contracts.  The first and most 
important one is that third party beneficiary status is consistent with the 
wishes of the promisee and promisor in resource contracts and second that 
resource contracts are made for the benefit of the public.  Third, I argue in 
favor of the principle on grounds of justice and morality, and fourth on 
public policy grounds. 
A.  Consistency Between Wishes of Contracting Parties and Third Party 
Beneficiaries  
Third party beneficiary status is consistent with the promises made 
between contracting parties in resource extraction contracts.134  In other 
words, allowing third parties to sue is necessary to effectuate the intentions 
of the parties to the contract.  Thus, the ability to sue on the part of a third 
party here is remedial, rather than substantive.135  It is remedial because the 
third party would be seeking to enforce the promises made between the 
contracting parties.  Here, standing for the third party would not necessarily 
depend on proving that the contracting parties intended to benefit the third 
party.  However, it is beyond doubt as this section will show, that natural 
resource contracts are intended for the benefit of the nationals and local 
peoples of the country where the resources are located. 
Although governments contract with investors as if natural resource 
extraction agreements are private contracts, they aim at producing public 
benefits and their proceeds are intended to benefit the public.  In many legal 
systems around the world, mineral resources and other resources such as 
water and lands are vested in States, however, the rights of the States to use 
                                                                                                                   
 133 Denis Tallon, The Principle of the Relative Effect of Contracts and the Theory of Groups 
of Contracts: Towards A New Reading of Article 1165 of the French Civil Code?, 6/7 TUL. 
CIV. L.F. 95, 97 (1991–1992). 
 134 See Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1386. 
 135 Id.  
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and dispose of these resources is understood to be limited if it would cause a 
substantial impairment to the interests of the public in such resources.136  
This principle is further reflected in many national Constitutions, which 
treat natural resources, not as market goods, but as public goods in which the 
national population has a direct interest.  The Egyptian Constitution, for 
example, declares that natural resources “belong to the people,” and that the 
people are “entitled to their revenues.”137  The Constitution further provides 
that the Egyptian state “is committed to preserving such resources for future 
generations and putting them to good use.”138  The Ghanaian Constitution 
similarly vests all minerals on its territory, lakes, territorial sea, and 
continental shelf “in the President on behalf of, and in trust for the people of 
Ghana.”139  The Iraqi Constitution provides that “oil and gas are owned by all 
the people of Iraq in all the regions and governates.”140  The 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution provides in part that its citizens have a right to “secure 
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting economic and social development.”141  In short, governments 
globally argue they need private investors, because private investors supply 
                                                                                                                   
 136 For example, in the United States, the public trust doctrine limits government’s use of land.  
In Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), the Supreme Court held that though the 
state may own certain public land (Lake Michigan), its title to that land was different from lands 
intended for sale; it was “a title held in trust for the people of the state that they may enjoy the 
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed 
from the obstruction or interference of private parties.”  Id. at 452.  In 1970, Professor Joseph 
Sax argued that the public trust doctrine applies also to environmental issues.  Danielle Spiegel, 
Note, Can The Public Trust Doctrine Save Western Groundwater?, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 412, 
429 (2010) (citing Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 556 (1970)).  Even the Supreme Court has held that 
states should not have complete control over their natural resources.  In Pennsylvania v. West 
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), the Supreme Court noted that if states could control their natural 
resources, “a singular situation might result: Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its 
timber, and the mining states their minerals.”  Id. at 599. 
  Since the 1970s, the public trust doctrine has been adopted in nations across the world.  
For example, the Supreme Court of India held: 
Our legal system—based on English common law—includes the public trust 
doctrine as part of its jurisprudence.  The state is the trustee of all natural 
resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment.  Public at 
large is the beneficiary of the sea-short, running waters, airs, forests and 
ecologically fragile lands.  The state as a trustee is under a legal duty to 
protect the natural resources. 
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388, 388 (India). 
 137 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Sept. 11, 1971, art.18. 
 138 Id. 
 139 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, art. 257(6). 
 140 DOUSTOUR JOUMHOURIAT AL-IRAQ [CONSTITUTION], 2005, art. 111 (Iraq). 
 141 CONSTITUTION, 2010, art. 30 (Kenya). 
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skills and technology to extract the natural resources that the governments 
own on behalf of their people.   
Investors also come with financial resources to pay for the extraction of 
natural resources that governments argue they need to extract to benefit the 
public.  These financial resources are in turn applied towards public projects, 
such as roads, or for paying for public education and health.  According to the 
African Natural Resources Center of the African Development Bank, African 
countries have about 30% of the world’s known reserves of minerals; about 
8%–10% of gas resources; and the largest reserves of cobalt, diamonds, 
platinum, and uranium.142  Ideally, investors would be able to turn these 
resources into income for the citizens of African countries, fostering economic 
growth and fortitude while benefiting their shareholders with higher profit. 
In an attempt to ensure these benefits inure to governments with extractive 
resources the private sector created the Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative.143  This global coalition is predicated on the view that the wealth 
generated from natural resources should be “an important engine for 
sustainable economic growth” that results in poverty reduction and that such 
wealth should be used in the interest of national development.144  This and 
similar initiatives recognize the use of natural resources to benefit the 
populations in the countries where extraction happens. 
Another group that has attempted to protect the interests of local 
communities is the World Bank.   The World Bank, one of the largest lenders of 
development finance to countries with large mineral deposits, established the 
World Bank Inspection Panel in 1993.145  The purpose of the Inspection Panel is 
to give people affected by World Bank-funded projects the right to bring to the 
Bank’s attention for corrective action adverse social and environmental impacts 
of Bank financed projects.146  The Inspection Panel undertakes this mandate by 
examining those social and economic impacts and ensuring the Bank follows 
appropriate operation policies and procedures.147  There are safeguards among 
the Bank’s operational policies and procedures to protect the environment, 
                                                                                                                   
 142 Africa’s Natural Resources: A Snap Shot, AFRICAN NATURAL RES. CTR., available at 
http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/african-natural-resources-ce 
nter-anrc/ (last visited May 19, 2015). 
 143 The EITI Principles, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/eiti/ 
principles (last visited July 31, 2014); EITI Countries, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY 
INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/countries (last visited July 31, 2014). 
 144 The EITI Principles, supra note 143, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 145 The Inspection Panel, WORLD BANK, http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/Abo 
utUs.aspx (last visited Aug. 3, 2014). 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
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including forests, as well as indigenous peoples and their cultural resources.148  
Noncompliance can lead to dire results.  For example, the World Bank withdrew 
support of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline project as a result of non-observance of 
its operational policies and procedures.149 
B.  Resource Development Should Benefit Local Citizens 
Among the most basic and universal principles of resource development 
is that it “should secure the greatest benefit for citizens.”150  In many low-
income, resource-rich countries, natural resources form a substantial part of 
the wealth of the country.151  Many of these countries depend on these 
resources to earn revenue to support their national budgetary needs to finance 
education, health, food, water, and other essential programs.  The revenue 
from these resources is also the only reliable source of funding for long-term 
investments like infrastructure.152  Therefore, development in general, 
including resource extraction, should be done primarily to benefit the 
people.153  However, there is often a divergence between theory and practice 
                                                                                                                   
 148 Id. 
 149 World Bank Pulls Out of Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project, ECON. TIMES (Sept. 10, 
2008, 5:44 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-09-10/news/27732853_1 
_chad-cameroon-chadian-government-pipeline-project. 
 150 The Twelve Precepts, NAT. RESOURCE CHARTER, http://naturalresourcecharter.org/precepts 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2014).  Indeed, in August 2014, the South African Development Community 
(SADC) will hold its annual summit in Zimbabwe, where it will focus on methods by which 
African countries can maximize the benefits of their natural resources.  Sean Woolfrey, 
Beneficiation in SADC, TRALAC (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/60 
46-beneficiation-in-sadc.html?utm_source=Weekly+tralac+Newsletter&utm_campaign=3ba006 
fd0d-NL20140813&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a95cb1d7ad-3ba006fd0d-269805525. 
This summit will follow efforts by many African nations to benefit local economies.  Id.  For 
example, in 2012, South Africa adopted a “Beneficiation Strategy” to promote industrialization. 
Id.  Botswana has taken steps to process locally mined diamonds.  Id.  Further, Zambia has raised 
taxes on mining companies and has introduced a “windfall tax” for high profits.  Id. 
 151 See infra Figure 1 (conveying that the percentage of natural capital in the wealth of low-
income countries is greater than in middle and high-income countries). 
 152 Naazneen H. Barma, Kai Kaiser, Tuan Minh Le & Lorena Vinuela, Rents to Riches? The 
Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development, WORLD BANK 78 (2012), available 
at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2381/659570PUB0EPI1073 
7B0Rents0to0Riches.pdf?sequence=1. 
 153 Professor Epstein notes that typically, the terms of the contract must directly provide for 
liability to the third party; this heightened standard is justified by the fact that these contracts 
are made to benefit third parties.  Epstein, supra note 19, at 2256–57.  So, the intended benefit 
to third parties ends up reducing their ability to sue.  Id. at 2257.  Based on the fact that 
citizens are often harmed by resource extraction contracts, this fact seems a bit ironic.  
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as evidenced by many examples of situations where citizens of countries rich 
in natural resources are deprived of their benefits.154 
Despite these problems with resource contracts, many groups have 
instituted policies to help citizens in resource contract situations.  The U.N. 
formally recognized that resource contracts should benefit citizens in its 
1986 Declaration on the Right to Development.155  This Declaration provides 
that “the human person is the central subject of the development process and 
that development policy should therefore make the human being the main 
participant and beneficiary of development.”156  Further, the Declaration 
makes the right to development “an inalienable human right,” which implies 
that citizens have the right to “full sovereignty over all their natural wealth 
and resources.”157  In addition, the Declaration puts the onus on States, 
giving them the “duty to formulate appropriate national development 
policies” that aim to improve the well-being of the entire population, 
resulting in the “fair distribution of [development] benefits.”158    
The importance and recognition of the right to development is reflected in 
subsequent U.N. resolutions, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, discussed below, and the U.N. Millennium Declaration.159  The 
                                                                                                                   
 154 Though these agreements should be made to benefit the citizens of resource-rich nations, 
the reality is that income generated from these agreements often falls into the hands of the 
affluent parties who trade these resources.  Thomas W. Pogge, Eradicating Systemic Poverty: 
Brief for a Global Resources Dividend, 2 J. HUMAN DEV. 59, 64 (2001).  Pogge notes, “[t]he 
global poor get to share the burdens resulting from the degradation of our natural environment 
while having to watch helplessly as the affluent distribute the planet’s abundant natural wealth 
amongst themselves.”  Id.  Additionally, foreign investors have engaged in practices that, 
while purporting to help local communities, actually harm those communities.  For example, 
the practice of “land grabs”—purchasing enormous amounts of land for farming—is said to 
benefit local communities.  Steve Baragona, UN: ‘Land Grab’ Deals Hurt Local Farmers, 
VOICE OF AM. NEWS (Dec. 7, 2012, 1:08 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/un-report-
land-grab-deals-hurt-locals/1560599.html.  However, in Ethiopia, foreign companies have 
spent over $2 billion leasing over 225,000 hectares of land for farming, but the harvests are 
exported back to the investors’ home countries.  Id.  Thus, fertile land that could produce food 
for local communities is instead used to supply food to already wealthy countries.  Id.  In 
countries like Ethiopia that already face severe food shortages, this practice is extremely 
detrimental.  Id.  To make matters worse, local communities allege that money that should 
have gone to the communities has instead fallen into the pockets of corrupt governments.  Id. 
 155 Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 
(Dec. 4, 1986). 
 156 Id.  
 157 Id. art. 1. 
 158 Id. art. 2(3). 
 159 James Thuo Gathii, The Cotonou Agreement and Economic Partnership Agreements, in 
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, REALIZING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 
259, 260 (2013).   
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Millennium Declaration, adopted during the Millennium Summit in 
September 2000,160 makes clear that the right to development, including 
through resource extraction, should be a “reality for everyone” and that 
globalization should be “a positive force for all the world’s people.”161    
Borne out of the Millennium Declaration were the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), a set of eight goals162 aimed at addressing the 
ideals set forth in the Millennium Declaration.163  The adoption of the MDGs 
further underscores that States accept the responsibilities and obligations set 
out in the Declaration on the Right to Development.164  In addition, the fact 
that the MDGs are specifically intended to benefit the people is reflected by 
the commitments made to “reduce poverty and hunger, to tackle ill health, 
gender inequality, lack of education, lack of access to clean water, and 
environmental degradation.”165   
In order to reach the MDGs and achieve the benefits sought, several 
international initiatives are centered on achieving these goals.  Then 
Secretary General of the U.N., Kofi Annan, sanctioned the U.N. Millennium 
Project to help recommend a plan for achieving the MDGs by 2015.166  The 
Project was an independent advisory composed of experts in development 
and sustainability that was tasked with identifying practical steps to achieve 
                                                                                                                   
 160 John W. McArthur, Own the Goals: What the Millennium Development Goals Have 
Accomplished, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2013, available at http://www.foreignaffairs. 
com/articles/138821/john-w-mcarthur/ownthe-goals (noting that the “heads of state accepted 
that they needed to work together to assist the world’s poorest people”). 
 161 United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, ¶ 5, 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 
(Sept. 18, 2000). 
 162 Goals, Targets and Indicators, U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, http://www.unmillenniumproject. 
org/goals/gti.htm#goal1 (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (the eight goals are as follows: (1) eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality 
and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) forge 
global partnerships among different countries and actors to achieve development goals). 
 163 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals, U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT 1 (2005), available at http://www.unmillenn 
iumproject.org/documents/overviewEngLowRes.pdf (stating that MDGs are the world’s time-
bound and quantified targets for addressing extreme poverty and basic human rights issues, as 
well as promoting gender equality, education, and environmental sustainability). 
 164 Gathii, supra note 159, at 261. 
 165 Andy Haines & Andrew Cassels, Can the Millennium Development Goals be Attained?, 
BMJ, Aug. 12, 2004, at 394, available at http://www.bmj.com/content/329/7462/394.  
 166 Q&A on the Millennium Project and its Report, U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, http://www. 
unmillenniumproject.org/resources/qa.htm (last visited July 31, 2014). 
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the MDGs in every country.167  The core recommendation of the Project is 
that the MDGs should be at the forefront of national and international 
poverty reduction strategies.168  Further, that developing countries must 
assess where they stand on achieving the MDGs and take the necessary 
interventions to meet the 2015 deadline.  
Other entities that have played an important role in helping to achieve the 
MDGs and further development around the world include civil society 
organizations like ActionAid or the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation.169  These organizations can raise awareness about the MDGs, 
mobilize support among key constituencies to keep pressure on leaders to 
follow through on commitments related to the MDGs, and can monitor 
progress and maintain transparency in investment, extraction or other 
development programs.170 
Another such initiative is the Millennium Cities Initiative (MCI), which 
was set up in association with the Millennium Project.171  MCI’s focus is on 
helping certain sub-Saharan African cities achieve the MGDs.172  MCI’s 
prepared report on resource-rich Blantyre, Malawi, found that investment in 
mining between 1999 and 2007 accounted for 73% of all foreign direct 
investment, and that further investment in mining presents a growing 
opportunity for development.173  A similar report on development in the 
lower Zambezi basin found that Mozambique could utilize its vast resources 
to achieve a major boost to its economic development.174 
  
                                                                                                                   
 167 Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Millennium Project: A Plan for Meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals, 365 LANCET 347 (2005), available at http://www.thelancet.com/journ 
als/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(05)17791-5/fulltext. 
 168 About the U.N. Millennium Project, U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, http://www.unmillenni 
umproject.org/who/index.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (discussing the project and its goals); 
see also Sachs, supra note 163 (giving a more detailed analysis of the Project’s ten 
recommendations).  
 169 Sachs, supra note 163, at 18 (other civil society organizations include Bread for the 
World, CIVICUS, DATA, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), 
Médecins sans Frontières, InterAction, Oxfam, RESULTS International, and Social Watch).  
 170 Id. 
 171 Malawi Blantyre, Potential Opportunities for Investment, KPMG 3 (Oct. 2009), 
available at http://academiccommons.columbia.ed/cataglo/ac%3A135570. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 13, 43.   
 174 See Zambazi Valley Development Study, COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. (June 6, 
2011), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2011/06/26/zambezi-valley-development-study/; see also Lisa 
Sachs et al., Resource-Based Sustainable Development in the Lower Zambezi Basin, VALE 
COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INT’L INV. (June 1, 2001).  
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While these are just some examples of international developments and 
strategies, it is clear that the right to development, including through resource 
extraction, is not only a right that belongs to the people, but is also a right 
that should primarily benefit them.  
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Figure 1 
  
Governments and investors argue that the development of natural 
resources is, not only for the benefit of investors, but also for the greatest 
possible benefit of the people in the country where the resources are located.  
Resource contracts therefore embody a very important underlying 
understanding—that they are an essential link to a country’s development.  
Botswana is an excellent example on how best to use natural resources to 
facilitate economic growth and development.  The following illustration 
demonstrates how Botswana has contributed to its national wealth and 
economic growth from the mining of its natural resources such as diamonds. 
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Figure 2175  
                                                                                                                   
 175 The Changing Wealth of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development for the New 
Millennium Released, WORLD BANK (Jan. 24, 2011, 9:13 AM), http://data.worldbank.org/ 
news/the-changing-wealth-of-nations. 
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Figure 3176 
 
And, as the figure above demonstrates, there is potential for resource-rich 
countries to grow their economies from mineral rents and taxes.  
Today, the international legal principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources is understood not merely as conferring on States the right 
to control the use of natural resources within its territory, but also as obliging 
states to proactively use those resources for the benefit of their people.177  To 
                                                                                                                   
 176 Id.  In February 2013, one Botswana Pula is of equal value to twelve U.S. Cents—that 
means sixteen trillion Pula is of equal value to one billion U.S. Dollars. 
 177 Kamal Hossain, Introduction to KAMAL HOSSAIN & SUBRATA ROY CHOWDHURY, 
PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at ix–xx 
(Kamal Hossain & Subrata Roy Chowdhury eds., 1984); Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent 
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illustrate, the Declaration provides in part that “The right of peoples and 
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources 
must be exercised in the interest of their national development and the well-
being of the People of the State concerned.”178  This Declaration does not 
create a right to assist citizens—it creates a duty. 
Further, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has recognized the 
rights of indigenous and non-indigenous groups to the natural resources 
within their lands.179  In the 2001 case between Awas Tingni Community and 
the government of Nicaragua, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
recognized indigenous peoples’ right to their land and affirmed that all 
people—including indigenous people—have the right to the “use and 
enjoyment of his property” pursuant to the American Convention on Human 
Rights.180  For its part, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights has construed Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, which gives people the right to dispose of their natural 
resources as obliging African governments to protect their citizens from 
damaging conduct perpetrated by private actors.  In this case, SERAC v. 
Nigeria, the Ogoni community of the Niger Delta alleged that the Nigerian 
government through its state owned oil company, which was in a consortium 
with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation, had exploited oil reserves in 
a manner that had degraded the environment, caused short-term and long-
term adverse impacts on the people and repressed the protests of the Ogoni 
people with violence and execution of their leaders.181 The Commission 
found the Nigerian government liable for violating Article 21 (disposition of 
natural resources shall be exercised for the exclusive interest of the people); 
Article 24 (the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to the 
development of peoples); Article 14 (right to property); Article 18 (failure of 
                                                                                                                   
Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33, 66–67 (2006). 
 178 Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc. 
A/5217 (Dec. 1962); see also Theodore Macdonald, Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Rules in Favor of Nicaraguan Indians, 25.4 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Winter 2001, available 
at http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/nicaragua/inter-am 
erican-court-human-rights-rules-favor-nic. 
 179 See Lisl Brunner, The Rise of Peoples’ Rights in the Americas: The Saramaka People 
Decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 699, 699 (2008). 
 180 The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 145 (Aug. 31, 2001).   
 181 The Social and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. and the Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Rights v. 
Nigeria, African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Comm. No. 155/96 of 2001), http:// 
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/Africa/comcases/155-96.html. 
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the state to protect the family as the natural unit and basis of society); Article 
4 (right to food); and Article 16 (right to health).182 
C.  Interests of Justice and Morality 
Although natural resources are a major source of the wealth of many low-
income resource-rich countries, such wealth is also highly correlated with the 
initiation, duration and persistence of violence.183  This violence has resulted 
in huge losses of human lives, property and the quality of lives of those that 
survive the violence.  Resource rich countries like the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Angola have a weak rule of law system, weak governance 
institutions that are bedeviled with corruption.  These institutions divert the 
wealth from natural resources from the national treasury for private gain.  
The mineral wealth of low-income resource rich countries can be used to 
finance capital enhancing programs such as infrastructure as well as 
important social programs in education, water, food and health as well as to 
fund social protection programs for the most vulnerable citizens and to save 
some of the income to ensure availability of financing when there is a down-
swing in commodity prices. 
In the foregoing sense, the Third Party Beneficiary Principle in resource 
extraction contracts is consistent with the interests of justice and morality.  
The underlying assumption here is that it is the just and moral thing for low-
income, resource dependent countries to invest income from their mineral 
wealth for the benefit of their current and future generations.  Under this 
                                                                                                                   
 182 Two new cases from the Supreme Court of Canada have articulated a new duty on the 
Crown—the constitutional duty to implement the honor of the Crown.  The new duty described 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in these two cases is described as a duty to consult and 
accommodate.  The Court stated that the duty is grounded in the honor of the Crown and 
emphasized that this principle is always at stake in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples.  The 
Court held that:  
[T]he historical roots of the principle of the honor of the Crown suggest that it 
must be understood generously in order to reflect the underlying realities from 
which it stems.  In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of 
sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties, the 
Crown must act honorably.  Nothing less is required if we are to achieve “the 
reconciliation of the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the Sovereignty 
of the Crown.”   
JEAN TEILLET, THE ROLE OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES REGULATORY REGIME IN ABORIGINAL 
RIGHTS DISPUTES IN ONTARIO 60 (Mar. 31, 2005) (citing Haida Nation v. British Columbia 
(Ministers of Forests), 2004 S.C.C. 73, ¶ 17). 
 183 PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007). 
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justification, the Third Party Beneficiary Principle arises independently of 
the express wishes of the parties to a resource extraction contract.184  
Such an approach to the Third Party Beneficiary Principle is 
contemplated by Restatement Second of Contracts Section 204, comment d, 
which provides that: “[W]here there is in fact no agreement [on a matter that 
falls within the ambit of a contract], the courts should supply a term that 
comports with community standards of fairness and policy rather than 
analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining process.”  
Such theories of fairness, justice and morality have increasingly become part 
of the discussion on international economic law in general and international 
trade law in particular.185  In the extractive industries context, issues of justice 
and morality are particularly relevant.  This is because these natural resources 
not only offer the best hope for addressing the pressing social and other 
challenges citizens of poor countries face, but also because the extraction of 
resources such as oil, hard-wood timber and minerals like diamonds is highly 
correlated with violence and massive abuses of human rights.  Unfortunately, the 
majority of citizens in resource-rich countries are at the very bottom of the 
global income ladder as the illustration below demonstrates.186  
                                                                                                                   
 184 Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1387. 
 185 FRANK J. GARCIA, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THREE TAKES 
(2013). 
 186 In countries like Canada, the rights of indigenous people must be specifically consulted.  
See supra note 182.  That is not the case in other contexts.  See, e.g., for example, Joel Ngugi, 
The Decolonization-Modernization Interface and the Plight of Indigenous Peoples in Post-
Colonial Development Discourse in Africa, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 297, 350 (2002) (discussing 
how the process of transposing the decolonization movement into an elaborate modernization 
program aimed at achieving “economic development” enabled a parallel process of silencing, 
dominating, and disempowering other sectors within the African State.  In the silencing, 
constraining and shaping that takes place, the Third World State is required, yet prevented 
from acquiring full status as a modernized state, while the indigenous groups within the Third 
World state are required, yet prevented from becoming fully modernized.). 
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Figure 4187  
 
Take the example of commercial timber logging—in countries as diverse 
as Brazil and Cameroon, loggers undermine the rights of forest peoples to 
manage and control the lands they call home and on which they rely not only 
for their livelihood, but also rely on for cultural and religious purposes.  
Loggers interfere with fishing, collecting, and hunting practices of forest 
communities thereby threatening their subsistence and cultural survival.188  
In short, mining, petroleum, logging, agribusiness, ranching, and tourism 
activities under-mine the ability of local communities to depend on the only 
resources they depend for their livelihoods and their cultural identity. 
                                                                                                                   
 187 U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, GREEN ECONOMY: POVERTY REDUCTION 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.unep.ch/etb/publications/GE%20Briefs%202012/Briefing%20paper 
%20GE_POVERTY%20REDUCTION.pdf.  
 188 Logging Impacts, SIERRA FOREST LEGACY (2012), available at http://www.sierraforestle 
gacy.org/FC_FireForestEcology/FFE_LoggingImpacts.php. 
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That is why it is important to structure resource extraction contracts in a 
way that explicitly accommodates the interests of these communities.  
Recognizing third party beneficiary rights is a superior way of 
accommodating the rights of affected communities than approaches that try 
to hold governments and resource extraction companies liable after the fact.  
Promoting accountability is vastly important, especially in low-income, 
resource-rich communities where powerful private parties could otherwise 
exercise their wealth, power, and access to corrupt governmental officials to 
the detriment of the citizens—to illustrate, the extraction of minerals 
accounts for only about 1% of African countries’ gross domestic product, 
though it accounts for 70% of their total exports.189 
Further, to promote the interests of justice and morality, in order to avoid 
exploitation of the natural resources of developing countries is through 
transparency initiatives.  One initiative at the forefront of the push towards 
better “global governance” is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
(KPCS).190  The KPCS is an “international certification scheme aimed at 
preventing the world diamond trade from funding conflicts and fueling 
human rights abuses.”191  The KPCS requires member countries to enact 
legislation that regulates, monitors, and ensures “conflict-free” diamond 
trading.192  Considering the adverse consequences to people that previously 
stemmed from the diamond trade, a key feature of the KPCS is the threat of 
expulsion from the KPCS that participating countries face for non-
compliance, which can lead to a ban on trading with other KPCS 
members.193  By extension, protecting people from violence and other human 
rights violations is so important that the KPCS’s restriction on diamond trade 
                                                                                                                   
 189 James Thuo Gathii, Beyond China’s Human Rights Exceptionalism in Africa: Leveraging 
Science, Technology and Engineering for Long-Term Growth, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
664, 678 (2013) (citing Avantika Chilkoti, Africa’s Extractive Industries: Dividing the Spoils, 
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012, 8:51 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/10/17/africas-ext 
ractive-industry-dividing-the-spoils). 
 190 Andrés Meijía Acosta, Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability 
Initiatives: Natural Resource Governance, INST. DEV. STUD. (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http:// 
www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/IETAAnnex4NatResGovMejiaAcostaFinal28Oct2010.pdf.   
 191 An Independent Commissioned Review Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Kimberley 
Process, GLOBAL WITNESS 1 (2006) available at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/ 
files/import/GW%20Commissioned%20Report%20on%20KP.pdf [hereinafter Effectiveness 
of the Kimberley Process].  
 192 See generally KIMBERLEY PROCESS, supra note 29 (describing the composition, structure, 
and function of the Kimberley Process).   
 193 Effectiveness of the Kimberley Process, supra note 191, at 5. 
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is allowed to operate by virtue of a rare waiver to the free trade rules of the 
World Trade Organization policy that promotes free trade.194 
Perhaps the most well known global transparency initiative is the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).195  The EITI has 
evolved into the model disclosure standard implemented by countries to 
resource extraction agreements.196  The purpose behind the EITI is to allow 
citizens to track government spending and revenues from the country’s 
natural resources, as well as promote greater accountability for such 
accounting practices.197 
An example of legal action at the domestic level is the United States’ 
adoption of an amendment to Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act that would require disclosure of 
payments by resource extraction issuers.198  The disclosure requirements in 
the Act are specifically intended to complement international transparency 
efforts like the EITI.199  The purpose behind the required disclosures is to 
increase the transparency of payments made by resource extraction 
companies to governments related to commercial development.200  The 
central goal of increased transparency under the Act “is to help empower 
citizens of those resource-rich countries to hold their governments 
accountable for the wealth generated by those resources.”201   
Furthermore, these transparency initiatives are indicative of the fact that 
resource extraction and development should primarily benefit the people.202    
D.  Public Policy Rationales  
As we saw above, rules of international law and national Constitutions 
recognize and declare the interests peoples have natural resources found in 
                                                                                                                   
 194 See Agreement Reached on WTO Waiver for “Conflict Diamonds,” WTO NEWS (Feb. 
26, 2003), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/goods_council_26fev03_e.htm; see 
also Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO for Political Debate 
on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 3 (2009).  
 195 What is the EITI?, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://www.eiti.org/ 
eiti (last visited Aug. 5, 2014).  
 196 Id.   
 197 Id. 
 198 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1504, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010). 
 199 Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Users, File No. S7-42-10, at 9 (Nov. 13, 
2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249). 
 200 Id. at 5. 
 201 Id. at 5–6.   
 202 See supra Part III.A. 
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their countries and localities.  To illustrate how this public interest 
recognition in natural resources is reflected in practice, this section discusses 
how this principle has received judicial recognition.  The example I use 
invoked the Indonesian Constitution, which in the relevant part provides that 
“The land, the waters and the natural resources within shall be under the 
powers of the State and shall be used to the greatest benefit of the people.”203  
This principle of public ownership of natural resources in Indonesia was 
consequential in a United States Federal Circuit case, Karaha Bodas Co. v. 
Perushaan Petrambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara.204  The issue in 
this case was whether trust funds held in fifteen Bank of America accounts 
from the sale of liquefied natural gas in Indonesia could be attached to satisfy 
an unrelated arbitration award of $261 million that KBC won against the 
government of Indonesia.205  The funds were held by an Indonesian 
governmental entity, Pertamina, whose goal under Indonesian law was to “to 
develop and carry out the exploitation of oil and natural gas . . . for the 
maximum prosperity of the People and the State.”206  
There are two ways in which Karaha Bodas is important to illustrate how 
public policy is critical in resolving legal challenges relating to extractive 
industry disputes.  First, although KBC—the corporation in the case—only 
sued Pertamina, the Indonesian agency charged with the development of 
liquefied natural gas, the Second Circuit allowed Indonesia’s Ministry of 
Finance to participate in the appeal although it had been a non-party in the 
proceedings before the District Court.207  The Ministry became involved only 
after KBC attached the trust accounts at Bank of America.208  The Second 
Circuit justified its decision based on precedent, noting that 
In Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 122 S. Ct. 2005, 2008, 
2013 (2002), the Court held that an unnamed member of a class 
could appeal a class action settlement at a fairness hearing even 
though he had failed to intervene earlier.  The Court cautioned 
that “[t]he label ‘party’ does not indicate an absolute 
                                                                                                                   
 203 THE 1945 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDON., art. 33, § 3, available at http://www.ilo.org/ 
wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_174 
556.pdf. 
 204 313 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 205 Id. at 75, 77–78. 
 206 Id. at 75. 
 207 Id. at 81.  
 208 Id.  
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characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability of 
various procedural rules that may differ based on context.”209  
Therefore, to the extent to which a non-party’s interest may be affected by 
enforcing a judgment to which he or she did not participate, that non-party 
would allowed to participate in proceedings related to execution or 
attachment of the judgment. 
Second, and equally important, the Second Circuit applied Indonesian law 
to determine the ownership of the funds in the trust accounts.210  New York’s 
choice of law rules dictate that the rules to determine ownership are those of 
the jurisdiction with the “greater interest,” and the facts and contacts that are 
significant in determining the interests of the state are those that relate to the 
purpose of the law in question.211  Under this test, the Second Circuit 
determined that the overwhelming weight of interests in the trust accounts 
favored the application of Indonesian rather than New York law in 
determining ownership of the Trust funds.212   
The Second Circuit concluded that New York’s interests were 
attenuated.213  According to the Court, an examination of Indonesian law 
under which Pertamina was established evinced a “significant national 
interest” in the fate of the trust funds.214  Determining whether or not New 
York or Indonesian law was applicable was therefore critical.  KBC argued 
in vain that because Pertamina controlled the trust accounts, it owned all the 
funds in the account, and as such they were all attachable to satisfy the 
arbitral award.215  The Second Circuit was not convinced—it agreed with the 
Indonesian Ministry and applied Indonesian law, holding that only 5% of the 
trust accounts that Pertamina owned were attachable.216   
                                                                                                                   
 209 Id.  
 210 Id. at 87. 
 211 Id. (the Indonesian interest in the funds was the maintenance of satisfactory exchange 
rate reserves.  Such reserves are critical for countries to be able to effectively participate in 
international trade.). 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. (according to the Second Circuit “New York statutory interests implicated here are 
relatively attenuated: (i) the creation and operation of trusts under New York law; (ii) the 
execution of sales contracts that operate under New York law to obtain funds for deposit in 
these trusts; (iii) New York’s general interest ‘in defining and protecting the property interests 
of its citizens and those who do business there,’ . . . ; and (iv) New York’s ‘interest as an 
international clearinghouse and market place . . . .’ ”).  
 214 Id.  
 215 Id. at 83, 88. 
 216 Id. at 92. 
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The Second Circuit found that the rest of the Trust funds were held in a 
constructive trust for the government of Indonesia.217  Because funds held in 
trust by Pertamina belonged to another party, the Second Circuit concluded 
that they were not subject to attachment under the law.218 
Ultimately, this Article uses Karaha Bodas to make two points.  First, 
that it is important to observe how public interest analysis is embedded in 
transactional disputes relating to resource extraction.  Here a conflict of law 
analysis allows the Indonesian ministry to appear as a non-party on appeal in 
the case since it is able to show interest in the money in issue.219  This 
interest was so significant that the Second Circuit held that its participation 
on appeal was permissible even if it had not been a party to the case in the 
district court.220  Second, the Second Circuit upheld the view embodied in 
Indonesian law, that the revenue generated from extracting liquefied natural 
gas was held in a constructive trust on behalf of the government and 
effectively of the people of Indonesia.221  In these two respects, the Second 
Circuit upheld the interests of the government of Indonesia against those of a 
foreign investor.  The Court declined to expand the remedies for KBC 
beyond those for which KBC had negotiated.222 
Further, unlike under colonial times, when resources were appropriated 
through capitulation treaties, contracts today govern access to these resources 
in a manner that balances the rights of investors and governments.223  Karaha 
Bodas demonstrates the importance and potential of pursuing transactional, 
and, in my view, contractual—approaches, to ensuring that beneficiaries of 
these resources actually benefit. 
                                                                                                                   
 217 Id.  
 218 Id. at 92–93. 
 219 Id. at 81. 
 220 Id.  
 221 Id. at 88. 
 222 Karaha Bodas Company LLC (KBC) is a company incorporated in the Cayman Island 
and owned by American power companies.  Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan 
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 223 JAMES THUO GHATTI, WAR, COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 153–54 (2011)  
(arguing that international lawyers of the early twentieth century came to believe that investor-
state arbitration was “an example of a larger set of voluntary and consensual processes that 
States could use to resolve conflicts rather than resorting to war.  These lawyers celebrated 
international law as a non-coercive solution through which problems, domestic and 
international, could be cooperatively and beneficially resolved.”). 
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V.  OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY STANDING 
IN RESOURCE CONTRACTS 
Parties often enter into contracts to enhance their wealth through 
exchange and to make reliable plans.224  Moving from this premise, 
objections against the Third Party Beneficiary Principle are advanced 
because the Principle interferes with the ability of contracting parties to 
enhance their wealth and make reliable business plans.225 A similar objection 
is that the Third Party Beneficiary Principle upsets the stability of the 
contractual relations between promisor and promisee.226  Indeed, this 
stability lies at the heart of contract law.227  According to this view, 
“[c]ontract liability, unlike tort liability, is based almost entirely on a 
consensual relationship,”228 and that its policy underpinnings are “more 
concerned with enforcing privately made bargains than with coercing 
behavior.”229 
The response to these objections is that third party beneficiary status is 
consistent with exchanged promises in resource extraction contracts.230  In 
other words, allowing third parties to sue is necessary to effectuate the 
intentions of the parties to the contract.231  Thus the ability to sue on the part 
of a third party here is remedial, not substantive.232  It is remedial because the 
third party seeks to enforce the contracting parties’ promises.  Here, third 
party standing would not necessarily depend on proving that the contracting 
parties actually intended to benefit the third party, but instead depends on 
effectuating the will of the parties.  
In addition, the objective of benefiting the local population lies at the core 
of resource extraction contracts.  A government contracting with an investor 
does not do so on its own behalf, but rather on behalf of its citizens.  This 
relationship is perhaps most apparent in contracts for public services.  Yet, in 
                                                                                                                   
 224 Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1374. 
 225 Id. at 1376. 
 226 Id. at 1386. 
 227 Id. at 1374. 
 228 Jean Fleming Powers, Expanded Liability and the Intent Requirement in Third Party 
Beneficiary Contracts, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 67, 79. 
 229 Id. at 80. 
 230 Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1386. 
 231 Id.  
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the end, all government contracts are contracts for public services, because 
the fundamental nature of government is to serve its citizens.233 
The paradigm of governments contracting with investors for the benefit of 
their citizens finds support in the theory of public trust.234  Under this theory, 
the nation-state claims ownership over the natural resources collectively 
belonging to the “people.”235  Its government, therefore, holds and 
administers the property in trust and, as the “people’s” representative, owes 
the people duties of loyalty, care, and good faith.236  Where the government 
holds natural resources in such public trust, “there exists in every contractual 
agreement between MNCs [multinational corporations] and host 
governments a silent and innumerable group of parties in interest: the 
‘people’ as third-party beneficiaries of all such investment contracts.”237 
In further response to the stated objections, contracting parties can 
employ drafting techniques to minimize the extent to which third party rights 
interfere with the parties’ ability to enhance wealth and make reliable 
business plans.  For example, in resource extraction contracts with third 
world governments, MNCs manage risk by including provisions that waive 
sovereign immunity and compel arbitration.  Together, such provisions could 
permit MNCs to seek contribution from contracting governments when 
facing lawsuits by community members.238  Business plans would, therefore, 
be reliable because the financial burden of resolving litigation would 
ultimately fall on the parties in proportion to their culpability under the 
contracts, if any.   
Another objection to adoption of the Third Party Beneficiary Principle is 
that it would open the floodgates of litigation against private parties 
                                                                                                                   
 233 See Patience A. Crowder, More than Merely Incidental: Third-Party Beneficiary Rights 
in Urban Redevelopment Contracts, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 287, 318 (2010) 
(discussing third party beneficiaries of urban redevelopment contracts). 
 234 See supra note 136 (discussing the evolution of the public trust doctrine). 
 235 See Wendy N. Duong, Partnerships with Monarchs-Two Case Studies: Case Two: 
Partnerships with Monarchs in the Development of Energy Resources: Dissecting an 
Independent Power Project and Re-Evaluating the Role of Multilateral and Project Financing 
in the International Energy Sector, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 69, 134 (2005) (proposing that 
the legal concepts of public trust, corporate derivative fiduciary duty, and third party 
beneficiary should govern certain types of business partnerships between third world 
governments and MNCs). 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 136. 
 238 See Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 517–28 
(2008) (discussing how contract and arbitration law could provide recourse for corporations 
held liable for international human rights violations when the contracting sovereign is jointly 
or exclusively responsible). 
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contracting with the government.  This is because government contracts 
benefit a large number of people and, as such, allowing third parties to sue 
on those contracts would subject investors and governments to endless 
litigation.  Justice Cardozo objected to precisely such a possibility in H.R. 
Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.239  The dissent in Just’s, Inc. v. Arrington 
Construction Co. raised similar objections.240  
Another objection to the Third Party Beneficiary Principle is that, if 
adopted, it could potentially impose liability greatly disproportionate to the 
potential benefits that investors stand to receive under government 
contracts.241  However, it is notable that the largest flows of foreign direct 
investment in Africa are highest in resource-rich countries such as Angola 
notwithstanding the political instability in those countries.242  In short, 
despite political instability, there are great gains to be made from extractive 
resources.  Unsurprisingly, investors and financiers in the natural resource 
extraction industry argue that they make natural resource investments not 
only for their benefit, but also to benefit local populations. 
Another objection is that investors will not assent to third party 
beneficiary clauses when contracting with governments.  The objection is 
similar to the argument doubting investors’ willingness to accept contracts 
that adopt the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.243  These Guidelines 
promote responsible business conduct worldwide by making MNCs 
                                                                                                                   
 239 According to Justice Cardozo, 
A member of the public may not maintain an action under Lawrence v. Fox 
against one contracting with the city to furnish water at the hydrants, unless 
an intention appears that the promisor is to be answerable to individual 
members of the public as well as to the city for any loss ensuing from the 
failure to fulfill the promise. 
H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (1928). 
 240 Just’s Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 583 P.2d 997, 1006–08 (Idaho 1978) (Donaldson, J., 
dissenting) (warning that, by allowing a member of the public to sue for breach of a public 
works contract between the government and a contractor, the majority was “open[ing] the 
door for numerous third party beneficiary suits involving governmental contracts”). 
 241 Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1407. 
 242 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York and Geneva, 2001, 
World Investment Report–Overview–Promoting Linkages, UNCTAD/WIR/2001 (Sept. 17, 
2001); see also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York and 
Geneva, 2006, World Investment Report: FDI From Developing and Transition Economies—
Implications for Development (Oct. 15, 2006) (showing that this trend has continued because 
of the boom in natural resources in recent times).  
 243 See Evaristus Oshionebo, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as 
Mechanisms for Sustainable Development of Natural Resources: Real Solutions or Window 
Dressing?, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 545, 589 (2013). 
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responsible to “respect and uphold human rights, workers’ rights, and 
environmental sustainability within the framework of international 
instruments.”244  However desirable it may be for developing countries to 
incorporate the OECD Guidelines into contracts, the intense competition 
among recipients for foreign investment coupled with the financial power 
and influence of MNCs, render the incorporation of these guidelines unlikely 
at the moment.245 
Yet, objections to inclusion of contractual terms unfavorable to investors 
are overstated. This is well illustrated by countries’ that have succeeded in 
adding provisions to contracts against private investors’ initial objections.  
To illustrate, Botswana negotiated extremely generous royalty payments that 
a very powerful investor, De Beers, strongly protested.246  After lengthy 
negotiations where Botswana contended that the initial contract with De 
Beers was unfair, Botswana prevailed.247 
Additionally, some MNCs take affirmative steps to prevent human rights 
violations.248  For example, a study of fourteen Dutch MNCs found that 
almost all of them required supply partners to sign codes of conduct, many of 
which became binding through incorporation into supply contracts.249  These 
codes of conduct included codes of social responsibility, extending to 
treatment of the suppliers’ and sub-suppliers’ employees, which in many 
cases established legally enforceable third-party beneficiaries.250 
The Dutch are not the only investors willing to bind themselves to protect 
third world citizens.  Some contracts between resource extraction companies 
and developing countries incorporate the World Bank’s social standards.251  
For example, the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline 
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Project incorporates the World Bank’s environmental standards.252  These 
examples demonstrate that the objection that investors would prohibit third 
party beneficiary clauses is overstated, and that even if investors did object to 
third party beneficiary clauses, their objections would not necessarily defeat 
incorporation of the clause in all cases. 
It is also an ill-conceived fear that incorporating third party benefits into 
resource extraction contracts will deter foreign investment.253  “[N]atural 
resources are available in commercial quantity in only a few countries, 
meaning that there is little room for forum shopping in terms of investment 
in natural resource exploitation.”254  This creates intense competition for 
access to natural resources and, therefore, makes it unlikely that third party 
beneficiary provisions would scare away investors.255 
Further, natural resource contracts between developing countries and 
foreign investors are often signed in secrecy, away from public forums such 
as Parliament.256  Having third party beneficiary status would permit third 
world communities to enforce natural resource contracts to benefit those 
most directly affected by natural resource extraction—typically themselves. 
Investor rights have generally been jealously and vigorously protected by 
restrictive interpretations of contract doctrines that create little wiggle room 
to deviate from such rights.257  In this context arbitrators or courts may 
follow the same restrictive path by finding that for third party beneficiary 
claims to stand, the parties must be shown to have explicitly intended to 
create such rights. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In my view, third party beneficiary rights ought to be available to third 
world citizens so they can hold accountable both their governments and 
investors when natural resources are exploited.  Requiring privity of contract 
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would ensure that citizens could not sue in contract when they are harmed.  
And, requiring privity is not the most logical approach—it is impossible to 
expect that citizens could be parties to a contract, and it is expected that 
governments contract on behalf of their citizens.  For these reasons, the Third 
Party Beneficiary Principle is a vastly better alternative. 
As mentioned above, natural resource contracts have a public nature.  
Resource extraction contracts between a government and foreign investor 
affect local citizens in profound and obvious ways.  For example, citizens 
might be forced to relocate, food and water sources could be polluted beyond 
repair, and resources that local communities could use could become 
depleted.  On the other hand, the benefits could be positive.  Mining, 
transportation, or other jobs could be created for otherwise jobless and 
destitute citizens.  Regardless of the actual outcome of these contracts, 
governments enter into these contracts for the benefit of local citizens.  
Because citizens are the intended beneficiaries of resource contracts, it only 
makes sense that they have rights in the event that any of the above harms 
occur. 
Adopting third party beneficiary rights will not only provide tangible 
benefits to local citizens, but they will also be more-than-ideal replacements 
for the currently unenforceable remedies, like contract and revenue 
transparency, codes of conduct, and the U.N. Norms on Business and Human 
Rights.  As currently applied, none of these approaches has been adequately 
enforceable, probably because they are voluntary and non-binding as a 
matter of law.  The Third Party Beneficiary Principle would function as an 
important and necessary tool, supplementing these existing approaches.  It 
would potentially solve problems that currently have no clear solutions.   
An important contribution of recognizing the Third Party Beneficiary 
Principle is that it would set one of the background rules or one of the ground 
rules against which contracts for negotiation of extractive resources would be 
conducted.  As a result, even if beneficiary communities were unable to 
pursue remedies in court, the recognition of the Third Party Beneficiary 
Principle would likely influence the negotiation of contracts by forcing the 
parties to take into account the rights of local communities.  
Granting third world citizens third party beneficiary rights would not 
restrict investor’s rights.258  The Third Party Beneficiary Principle would not 
necessarily bind investors to the law of the country and bar all international 
remedies—like arbitration.  Instead, it would provide third world citizens 
with a mechanism with which they can enforce existing agreements and hold 
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responsible parties accountable in the event that harms occur.  The risk to 
investors therefore is not a reduction of rights, but is instead the ability for 
citizens to sue when harms occur.    
My argument in short has been that the Third Party Beneficiary Principle 
should become a background norm against which negotiations of resource 
contracts take place.  In this context, governmental natural resource contracts 
would consider citizens as beneficiaries to the resources available in their 
countries.  This approach would not only account for the rights of citizens, 
but would provide an avenue for redress in the event of harm to the citizens.  
Though not perfect, third party beneficiary rights would provide far better 
protection to citizens and would outperform any of the currently available 
remedies. 
       
